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How does bank capital regulation affect the design of credit derivative contracts? How does 
the opacity of the OTC credit derivative markets affect these contracts? In this paper we 
address these issues and characterize the optimal security design in several settings. We 
show that both the level of the banks' cost of capital and the opacity of the credit derivative 
markets do affect the form of the optimal separating contract and the level of the banks' 
profits. Moreover, our results suggest that the optimal contracts are largely dependent on 
bank regulation. More specifically, the introduction of Basel II may prevent the use of the 
equity tranche in CDO contracts as a signaling device. In addition, the presence of private 
credit derivative contracts would make the use of signaling contracts able to solve the 
adverse selection problem quite expensive. 
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The recent advent of credit derivatives has provided banks with a whole range
of ﬂexible instruments for selling loans and transferring loan risk. For example, pure
credit derivatives, such as plain vanilla credit default swaps (CDSs) allow banks to buy
protection on a single exposure or on a basket of exposures; portfolio products, such
as Collateralized Debt Obligations1 (CDOs), enable banks to sell risks from their entire
loan portfolio.2 One main advantage of these new instruments over traditional forms of
credit risk transfer is their ﬂexibility, which helps to mitigate informational problems.
In this paper we investigate the problem faced by banks needing to signal their
quality when they use credit risk transfer instruments, a problem that results from the
asymmetry of information on their loan portfolios. In line with current market practice,
we assume that credit derivative trades are opaque and therefore the banks that need to
transfer the credit risk of their loan portfolios (risk-sellers) cannot make a commitment
to a speciﬁc partial risk holding to signal their quality.
We also assume that banks are subject to minimum regulatory capital requirements
and that bank capital is costly. We focus on capital requirements that prevent regu-
latory arbitrage and help to reduce the probability of bank default. The less-intrusive
capital adequacy rule suggested by regulators in pursuit of this objective is that bank
capital must cover losses due to loan defaults, with a given probability (see BCBS (2005)
commonly known as Basel II, Internal Ratings-Based).
1A CDO is an asset-backed security whose underlying collateral is typically a portfolio of bonds
or bank loans. A CDO cash-ﬂow structure allocates interest income and principal repayments from a
c o l l a t e r a lp o o lo fd i ﬀerent debt instruments to a prioritized collection of CDO securities, usually called
tranches. A standard prioritization scheme is known as simple subordination: senior CDO tranches
are paid before mezzanine and lower-subordinated notes, with any residual cash ﬂow paid to an equity
tranche.
2Surveys of BBA (2002), BIS (2003, 2005) and Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2005) show that the
volume of trade in credit derivatives has known a huge increase in recent years.
2These assumptions suggest two research questions that have not yet been considered
in the literature to our knowledge. First, how do the diﬀerent institutional settings
(namely, the introduction of new regulatory capital requirements) inﬂuence the optimal
design of the contracts that risk-sellers may oﬀer to signal their own types? More
speciﬁcally: is the equity tranche holding, largely used by banks in recent years, an
optimal signalling contract under the new Basel II regulatory framework? Second, how
does the presence of credit derivatives aﬀect the optimal design when a party cannot
credibly commit to retain partial risk holding? Our analysis allows us to answer both
questions by determining the optimal security design.
We start by considering the case where the risk-seller can commit to retain some
risk. We show that the optimal contract would be similar to selling the loan portfolio
and writing a binary credit default basket (Binary CDB), i.e. a credit default basket
where the payoﬀ is a ﬁxed dollar amount that could be considered a penalty payment
in case defaults are above a certain level. This optimal separating contract leaves the
bank with the same level of losses in most of the states of the world in which a default
occurs and therefore induces the lowest level of capital requirements for the bank. We
show that the ﬁxed dollar amount depends on the cost of capital. In fact, when the cost
of capital is increasing, low-type banks have a lower incentive to mimic high-type banks.
This implies that the ﬁxed dollar amount that sustains the separating equilibrium is
decreasing in the cost of capital. Namely, when the cost of capital goes to inﬁnity the
ﬁxed dollar amount that sustains the separating equilibrium is (almost) zero and as also
are the capital requirements.
The second setting we consider is when the risk-seller cannot make a credible ex-ante
commitment to retain any risk. In this setting, a low-type bank is able to cover the
risk of the ﬁxed dollar amount payment (i.e. to hedge the binary credit default basket)
3without allocating bank capital to satisfy capital requirements. Therefore, the cost of
capital does not enter into the incentive compatibility constraint of the low-type, and so
the ﬁxed dollar amount that sustains the separating equilibrium does not depend on the
cost of capital. When the cost of capital is large, high-type banks also prefer hedging the
binary credit default basket rather than retaining the risk of such a contract and facing
the cost of capital. It follows that in this case the optimal signalling contract is such
that there is never a capital loss and therefore the cost of capital is almost zero. This
non-negativity constraint reduces the high-type banks’ proﬁts in all states of the world,
and it may also imply that the pooling equilibrium is preferred by high-type banks.
The above results allow us to investigate the potential implications of diﬀerent capital
adequacy rules on the optimal separating contracts. In fact, we argue that the optimal
contracts are largely dependent on bank regulation. The introduction of Basel II may
prevent the use of the equity tranche as a signalling device because Basel II will require
that all ﬁrst loss positions be deducted from bank capital and therefore the equity
tranche holding would be too costly. Under Basel II, our model suggests that the Binary
CDB contract would be optimal. However, as our results show, the opaqueness in the
credit derivative market would make the use of this signalling contract quite expensive.
In summary, the introduction of Basel II may change the optimal signalling contract
characteristics and the opacity of the credit derivative OTC markets will increase the
cost of the signalling contract.
Note that later on we do not distinguish between opaqueness in trading (more related
to CDS markets) and problems in pre-commitment to retaining risk (more related to
CDO markets). Since the eﬀects in terms of contract design are the same we refer to
them without distinctions.
4The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the related literature. In
Section 3 we present the basic model and we analyze the benchmark case with symmetric
information. In Section 4 we consider the asymmetric information case and we present
our results. In Section 5 we present some regulatory implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The tremendous development in credit derivative markets has received the attention of
both regulators and policy makers. Most international and national supervisors have
published reports on the topic (e.g. IMF (2002), BIS (2003, 2005)). However, the
majority of the concerns are on a purely informal basis, which is due to the lack of
theoretical work on these issues. Exceptions are Duﬀee and Zhou (2001), Morrison
(2005), and Parlour and Plantin (2005).
Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) demonstrate that the problem of adverse selection may be
overcome by drawing up credit derivatives with a smaller maturity than that of the
underlying asset.3 The key assumption in their model is the hypothesis that the bank’s
information advantage changes over time and, in particular, is greater when it is close
to the maturity date of the loan. Our approach is diﬀerent, because we assume neither
that the bank’s information advantage decreases over time, nor that there is perfect
observability of credit derivative contracts.
Morrison (2005) shows that if credit derivative trades are opaque, so that the protec-
tion buyer cannot make an ex-ante commitment to a speciﬁc protection level, banks have
a moral hazard incentive to hedge their exposure fully and therefore cease to monitor.
This behavior has the negative eﬀect of causing disintermediation and thus reducing
3Moreover, Duﬀee and Zhou (2001) show that the mechanism, proposed by Gorton and Pennacchi
(1995) to reduce the moral hazard problem associated with the loan sales, is broadly applicable to any
mechanism that transfers loan risk outside of the bank, including credit derivatives.
5welfare. In our paper we take a diﬀerent approach than Morrison (2005) because we in-
vestigate the adverse selection problem and show how the opacity in the credit derivative
markets matters in the optimal credit derivatives design.4
Parlour and Plantin (2005) consider the eﬀect of credit risk transfer on relationship
banking. They concentrate on the optimal mix of equity, bonds, and loans, and show
that liquidity eﬀects can arise endogenously in credit derivative markets when banks are
net protection buyers. As for Duﬃe and Zou (2001) and Morrison (2005), Parlour and
Plantin (2005) concentrate on the CDS market and in contrast to our paper, they do
not address the security design issue.
Even ignoring the capital requirement issue and the contract observability problem,
the theoretical literature on credit derivatives and the problem of asymmetries of infor-
mation is limited. DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) and DeMarzo (2005) focus on liquidity
problems with asymmetric information. More precisely, they have shown that, in line
with Leland and Pyle (1977), pooling and sharing may be optimal when the protection
buyer has superior information. They argue that the sharing process allows the protec-
tion buyer to concentrate the “lemon’s premium” on the small ﬁrst-loss or equity tranche
and create a relatively large, low-risk senior tranche. Also, the risk-seller’s retention of
the subordinate tranche reduces the total lemon’s premium by creating an incentive for
the risk-seller to align its interests with those of the risk-buyers. The main diﬀerence
with our work is that we rule out the possibility of using the quantity of the security
sold on the market as a signalling device, due to the opacity of the credit derivative
market. Security issuers may only signal their own type by oﬀering diﬀerent contracts,
but they cannot credibly commit to retain a portion of the security. In DeMarzo and
4Chiesa (2005) shows that Morrison’s (2005) problem could be solved using an optimal credit risk
transfer instrument, i.e. transferring exogenous risk. In this way the bank lowers the amount of capital
that it must put at stake for ﬁnding an incentive-compatible mechanism to monitor/screen the loans it
originates.
6Duﬃe (1999), pre-design information does not aﬀect results, roughly speaking, because
the quantity is "the best signal" the issuer can use to signal its own type. In our setting,
in which we rule out the possibility of using the quantity sold as a signal of the issuer’s
type, the assumption of pre-design asymmetric information turns out to be fundamen-
tal. Moreover, in our model we focus on costs induced by capital requirements based on
maximum losses due to loan default and not on frictions generated by expected liquidity
costs. Finally, as a minor diﬀerence between the two models, we allow the (re)payment
due to the buyer of the security to be larger than the cash-ﬂow of the asset. Thus, we
allow for contracts that are not feasible in a setting (like that of DeMarzo and Duﬃe
(1999)) in which the signalling contracts’ cash ﬂows are restricted so as to be lower than
those of the underlying portfolio in all states.5 Because of these three main diﬀerences,




Let us consider a market where there is a bank (risk-seller) operating in the local loan
market, which may hedge its exposures in the credit derivative market by selling credit
risk to other ﬁnancial institutions (risk-buyers).
Risk-sellers and risk-buyers are both risk neutral and, for simplicity, the riskless
interest rate is zero. The risk-seller belongs to one of two diﬀerent bank types: high-
5For a more complete overview of the issues that arise with various instruments for credit risk transfer
see Kiﬀ, Michaud and Mitchell (2003). For studies that assume symmetric information and investigate
risk-sharing eﬀects see Allen and Carletti (2006). Empirical evidence on asymmetries of information and
insider trading in the CDS markets and on why banks use credit derivatives are provided respectively
by Acharya and Johnson (2005) and Minton et al. (2005).
7type (denoted by h) and low-type (denoted by l). Both types vary only with respect to
the quality of their loan pools for the credit risk on which the bank seeks protection.
The quality of the pools is assumed to depend on borrowers’ ability to repay loans
and therefore the risk-seller’s quality can be represented by the probability that its
borrowers repay loans. This probability is greater for a high-type risk-buyer than for a
low-type. Let pi for i = {h,l} be the probability of success for loan repayment, then
0 ≤ pl <p h ≤ 1,w h e r epl and ph are the probability of loan success held by a low-type
and a high-type risk-seller, respectively.
The model incorporates two dates: 0 and 1. On date 0, the risk-seller holds a portfolio
of two commercial loans with ﬁxed size: I1 and I2, w h i c hm a t u r eo nd a t e1 .B o t hc r e d i t
lines can default only at the maturity date and are uncorrelated.6 For simplicity, we
assume here that the recovery value is equal to zero. Moreover, all the cash ﬂows occur
at the maturity of the contracts.
M a k i n gal o a no fa m o u n tI, a risk-seller i = {h,l} obtains an expected proﬁt Eπi =
pi (1 + µ)I − I,w h e r eµ is the interest rate, which is the same for both types. Hence,
risk-buyers cannot infer risk-sellers’ types from the interest rate.7 Moreover, we assume
that µ ≤ 1; this assumption allows us to simplify our analysis and is suﬃciently mild
not to undermine the generality of our results. We assume that Eπh >E π l ≥ 0, that
is both types of loans have non-negative net present value (NPV)). The loan portfolio
cash ﬂows S are characterized by 4 states; State 1: no default (S1 =( I1 + I2)(1+µ)),
and the three default states, State 2: default of only loan 1 (S2 = I2 (1 + µ)), State 3:
default of only loan 2 (S3 = I1 (1 + µ)), State 4: default on both loans (S4 =0 ) .
6The key aspects of the paper are not based on diversiﬁcation opportunities; the assumption that
there are no other assets in the bank’s portfolio allows us to present our results in a very simple
framework focussing on the use of credit derivatives to cover exposures.
7This assumption is in line with the statement of Duﬀee and Zhou (2001), according to which there
is no one-to-one relation between the interest rate charged by a bank and the quality of borrowers. We
can assume that the interest rate were determined at some stage earlier than date 0 of the model and
now loans may have changed in quality.
8Banks ﬁnance the portfolio of loans with deposits. Therefore, losses will push the
bank toward insolvency if it has insuﬃcient capital to cover them. Because of either
deadweight costs generated by insolvency or capital requirements, the bank, even if risk
neutral, cares about risk and holds capital as a buﬀer to cover losses or to satisfy capital
requirements. We assume that bank capital is invested in a short term asset and is not
used to ﬁnance the portfolio of loans. Moreover, although bank shareholders are risk
neutral, the cost of capital, denoted by ρ, is assumed to be greater8 than the cost of
deposits, which is normalized to zero.9
These assumptions simplify the model considerably because we do not need to model
explicitly the bank’s capital structure nor its capital adequacy rules in detail but we refer
more generally to the bank capital needed to prevent default, with a given probability α.
We assume10 that α>p h and this implies that the bank capital has to cover all losses.
Here we focus on the case in which banks use credit derivatives in order to reduce
capital requirements and therefore the cost of capital. The credit derivative market we
consider is characterized by the presence of diﬀerent types of contracts. At time 0, the
risk-seller simultaneously oﬀers credit derivative contracts to the risk-buyers.11 Since
there are many risk-buyers, we assume that the risk-seller faces a competitive market.
At the time of the proposal, the risk-seller’s type is private information. Hence, we
assume that the risk-seller has full bargaining power and makes a take—it or leave-it
oﬀer to a risk-buyer. Finally, let 0 <q<100% be the percentage of high-quality banks
among the risk-sellers.
8See Dewatripont and Tirole (1993), Froot and Stein (1998) and Gorton and Winton (1998) for
explicit models of why ρ might be positive.
9Introducing a positive ﬂat deposit insurance premium would reduce the spread by the cost of capital
but this extra cost will be reﬂected in the cost of loans without altering our results.
10Under Basel II, α is set at 99.9%.
11We assume that protection sellers are not subject to capital requirements because, in line with
empirical evidence, they are largely insurance companies or hedge funds (see BIS (2005)).
93.2 The benchmark case: symmetric information
If a bank is issuing a portfolio of loans (I1,I 2), its maximum loss, with a conﬁdence
level α, is I1 + I2 that we observe in State 4 given our assumption that the recovery
rate is zero (i.e. capital requirements are I1 + I2). Under this framework, in order to
prevent default (or satisfy capital requirements) the bank has to guarantee loan losses
with bank capital equal to I1 + I2.L e t Eπi denote the expected proﬁts of a bank of
quality i = {h,l} when it does not transfer its risk. We have:
Eπi = pi(I1 + I2)(1 + µ) − (I1 + I2) − ρ(I1 + I2) with i = h,l, (1)
where ρ(I1+I2) is the required remuneration for the bank capital buﬀer that guaran-
tees loan losses. In order to reduce loan losses and therefore the capital buﬀer, the bank
can sign credit derivatives. In our model, the credit event is identiﬁed with a failure to
pay at the maturity date. The credit event payment is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the nominal value plus the accrued interest and the recovery value of the defaulted loan
that is equal to zero in our framework. Moreover, we assume that all the cash ﬂows
(including payment of the premiums) occur at the maturity of the contracts.
When the risk-seller’s type is common knowledge, then the lowest premium that
a risk neutral risk-buyer is willing to accept is the fair premium. Hence, the lowest
premium that will fully insure a bank of type i with loan Ij by means of a plain vanilla
CDS contract is:
Φi (Ij)=( 1− pi)Ij(1 + µ) with i = h,l and j =1 ,2. (2)
10Signing a CDS basket contract on the bank’s loan portfolio, the expected proﬁts of a
risk-seller of type i, denoted Eπi(CDS), are:
Eπi(CDS)=µ(I1 + I2) − Φi (I1) − Φi (I2) with i = h,l. (3)
Observe that loan losses are completely covered by the CDS basket and therefore there
are no capital requirements and no costs of capital. Since by assumption the NPV of
the loans is positive for both types i = h,l, it follows that expected proﬁts are positive.
It is straightforward to note that, with complete information, the full coverage CDS
basket is a ﬁrst-best contract.
4 Asymmetric information
4.1 Pooling equilibria
In any pooling equilibrium the minimal premium that a risk-buyer is willing to accept
in order to sign a plain vanilla contract that fully hedges the counterpart against the
credit risk of the loan Ij is:
Ω(Ij)=q(1 − ph)Ij(1 + µ)+( 1− q)(1− pl)Ij(1 + µ) with j =1 ,2. (4)
Signing a full coverage CDS basket, a risk-seller of type i obtains the following expected
proﬁt:
Eπi(FCPL)=µIj − Ω(Ij) with i = h,l and j =1 ,2. (5)
As usual, it is easy to ﬁnd the pooling equilibrium where both types of risk-sellers sign
the same contract. In particular, it is straightforward to check that there exists a pooling
11equilibrium such that risk-sellers of both types sign the CDS basket. The risk-buyer’s
beliefs are such that, if a full coverage CDS basket is oﬀered, the risk-seller is a high-type
with probability q; if any contract diﬀerent than a full coverage CDS basket is oﬀered,
then the risk-seller is a low-type with probability 1. It is clear that high-type banks’
proﬁts are lower than their proﬁts in a game with complete information and the lower
the number of high-type banks in the market, the stronger is the incentive to signal their
own type. We devote the next section to analyzing separating equilibria.
4.2 Separating equilibria
In this section we prove the existence of separating equilibria and we show how the
optimal separating contract varies according to the presence of capital requirements and
the ability of the banks to commit to retaining some risk that high-type banks use to
signal their own types. We restrict our attention to contracts according to which a bank,
in order to satisfy capital requirements, sells its loans by creating a security. The payoﬀ
of the security, F, i sm a d ec o n t i n g e n to nt h eo u t c o m eo ft h eu n i q u ev e r i ﬁable signal, the
cash ﬂows of the loans, i.e. F(S). The design of the security may vary and we deﬁne
the optimal security as that which maximizes the security issuer’s proﬁts. Let P be the
price of the security.
4.2.1 The benchmark case: optimal separating contract with no cost of
capital
In our framework, when capital is costless a bank has no incentive to create a security.
However, the case of costless capital is a useful benchmark for analyzing how the presence
of capital constraints and the opacity of the credit derivative market aﬀect the optimal
design of the security. Since both the risk-sellers and the risk-buyers are risk neutral
12there exist diﬀerent forms for transferring the risk, which are equivalent in term of
welfare, all of them providing the ﬁrst-best level of proﬁts (ph(1 + µ) − 1)(I1 + I2) to
the high-type bank. One optimal credit derivative is the trivial contract such that the
bank sells its loans at price PPS =( I1 + I2)(1 + µ), and it commits to insuring the
risk-buyer fully (that is, to repay I(1 + µ) in case of default of loan I). More formally,
the bank sells its loan portfolio and writes a Put with strike price K =( I1 +I2)(1+µ),
i.e. F(S)=max(K − S,0) and the contract is [PPS,max(K − S,0)].
Another credit derivative contract, which is useful to highlight in order to compare
it with the optimal separating contracts when the capital is costly, is the binary credit
default basket contract (Binary CDB). According to this security, the issuer commits to
pay a ﬁxed dollar amount L to the risk-buyer in case of default of any loan, where the
amount L is ﬁxed and independent with respect to the loss suﬀered by the risk-buyer,
i.e. F(S)=( L|S<(I1+I2)(1+µ)). The optimal credit derivative contract [PNC,L NC]
is such that:
P









(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)
(ph + pl)
. (7)
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 1 When bank capital is costless, there exists a separating equilibrium where
high-type banks issue a credit derivative that guarantees to them the ﬁrst-best level of
proﬁts; low-type banks oﬀer a plain vanilla contract.
Proof. See the appendix.
13Remark 1 This separating equilibrium is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium sat-
isfying the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
In order to overcome the multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we only consider
separating equilibria that satisfy the intuitive criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps
(1987) for a signalling game (denoted “CK-criterion”). Given that we employ this re-
ﬁnement concept several times, it is worth giving an informal intuition of how it works.
Consider that a risk-seller makes an out-of-equilibrium proposal and consider any conjec-
ture that it has about how the risk-buyer reacts. If it happens that, given the risk-buyer’s
most optimistic conjecture (the risk-buyer believes that the proposer is a high-type bank,
with probability one), a high-type bank ﬁnds it optimal to deviate while the low-type
does not, then the intuitive criterion assigns probability 1 that the proposer of such a
contract is a high-type bank.
4.2.2 The optimal separating contract with costly capital
When bank capital is costly the trivial contract [PPS,max(K −S,0)] is clearly no more
an optimal separating contract. In fact, it induces a maximum capital loss equal to
(I1 + I2) for the issuer of the security. The contract [PNC,L NC] performs better since
the induced maximum capital loss is equal to:
R
NC =( L
NC +( I1 + I2) − P
NC)=( I1 + I2)
µ




which is positive but lower than (I1 + I2). However, this is not the optimal contract
since the amount of capital loss that a high-type bank needs to signal its own type should
optimally depend upon the cost of capital ρ. In fact, the larger the cost of capital, the
larger also is the cost for the low-type bank in mimicking the high-type. To ﬁnd the
14optimal security, recall that both risk-buyers and risk-sellers are risk-neutral. Therefore
the issuer optimally splits up an equal repayment in all states of the world in which at
least one default occurs, in order to minimize the total loss. It is worth noting that the
default of one loan occurs with probability 2pi(1 − pi) for a bank of type i. It follows
from our assumption that, conditioned on the event "only one default" occurred, the
probability that the bank is low-type is larger than the probability that the issuer is a
high-type.12
Therefore, the optimal contract will be the separating contract that leaves the high-
type bank the same, lowest, payoﬀ in the three default states as shown in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 When bank capital is costly, the optimal separating contract for high-
type banks is the binary credit default basket contract [PC,L C] such that:
L
C =
(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)(ph(1 + ρ) − pl) − ρ(I1 + I2)
p2





C =( 1− p
2
h)
(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)(ph(1 + ρ) − pl) − ρ(I1 + I2)
p2
h(1 + ρ) − p2
l
+ ph(I1 + I2)(1 + µ), (10)
where PC is the price paid by the risk-buyer for buying the bank portfolio and LC is the
amount that the risk-seller has to pay in case of default of any loan.
Proof. See the appendix.
12The event "one default" occurs with higher probability for a low-type bank than a high-type if the
following holds: ph + pl > 1, which follows by our assumptions that the low-type NPV is positive and
µ<1.
15Remark 2 The unique separating equilibrium that satisﬁes the CK-criterion is such
that high-type banks oﬀer the contract [PC,L C] and low-type banks oﬀer the plain vanilla
contract. Risk-buyers’ beliefs are such that a risk-seller is high-type if it oﬀers the optimal
separating contract [PC,L C],i ti sal o w - t y p eo t h e r w i s e .
In this case the high-type banks face a maximum capital loss equal to:
µ
(ph − pl)((ph + pl)(I1 + I2) − phpl(I1 + I2)(1 + µ))
(p2





w h e r ew ed e n o t eb yRC the maximum capital loss induced by the contract [PC,L C]
that is lower than RNC.
Let Eπh(PC,L C) denote the high-type bank’s expected proﬁti ns i g n i n gt h ec o n t r a c t
[PC,L C]; we have that:
Eπh(P
C,L
C)=( I1 + I2)(ph(1 + µ) − 1) − ρR
C. (12)
i.e. the expected level of proﬁts is equal to the ﬁrst-best level, less the cost of capital.
A high-type bank signals its type by committing to pay a ﬁxed penalty in case of
default of one loan. This signal turns out to be costly when bank capital itself is costly,
but the cost for the high-type bank is lower than it faces with the contract [PNC,L NC].
Not surprisingly, we have that LC = LNC if ρ =0 , while it is worth noticing that
∂RC
∂ρ < 0, that is, the maximum capital loss is decreasing in the cost of capital ρ since
it enters into the low-type bank’s self-selection constraint and therefore it reduces the
incentive for the low-type bank to sign this type of contract. In particular, RC tends to
zero when the cost of capital tends to inﬁnity. The optimal separating contract when
capital is costly is no longer a ﬁrst-best contract due to the presence of the capital
16requirements. This aﬀects the level of high-type bank proﬁts and the set of optimal
contracts shrinks to only those with a ﬁxed dollar amount repayment.
4.2.3 The optimal separating contract when capital is costly and the credit
derivative market is opaque
As we showed above, the optimal separating contract [PC,L C] depends on the cost of
capital ρ. Unfortunately this occurs only if the risk-seller is able to commit itself to
sustain this cost of capital in the future. From now on, we assume that a bank cannot
commit to retain such a cost. A contract in which a bank commits to retain this cost is
not veriﬁable in front of a court, even if it may be observed by those who bought fractions
of this security. It follows that the cost of capital ρ cannot appear in the self-selection
constraint for the low-type bank. In fact a low-type bank, after having sold the Binary
CDB can buy a hedging contract at price (1−p2
l) per unit of ﬁx e dd o l l a ra m o u n ti nc a s e
of default and avoid the cost of capital ρRC. The combination of the credit derivative
contract [PC,L C] and a contract hedging LC provides larger expected proﬁts to the low-
type bank than hedging the loan portfolio wi t ht h eC D Sb a s k e t ,a n dt h e r e f o r ep r o v i d e s
an incentive to mimic the high-type bank. All the more so, the same reasoning holds
when credit derivative contracts are private, and therefore the party who buys a portion
of the security cannot even observe if the seller of the security secretly hedges LC with
some other risk-buyers. Since trading in the Binary CDB market is relatively opaque,
it appears that observability is the main relevant issue we are considering here, and for
this reason we stress this aspect.
Lemma 1 If the credit derivative market is opaque then the contract [PC,L C] does not
sustain a separating equilibrium.
Proof. See the appendix.
17The opacity of the credit derivative market makes more costly for high-type banks
to signal their own type. In fact, the cost of capital enters no more into the self-selection
constraint of a low-type bank since it can always hedge its exposures. Therefore the lack
of commitment has an impact on both the optimal separating contract and the level of
proﬁts of the high-quality banks.






l , the optimal separating contract for high-type banks is the contract [PNC,L NC],






l , then the optimal separating contract is:
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O =












Proof. See the appendix.
It is easy to provide an intuition for this result. The cost of capital does not enter
into the self-selection constraint. Low-type agents can in fact hedge the Binary CDB.
Therefore, there are only two types of credit derivative contracts that can credibly sustain
a separating contract. The ﬁr s tt y p ei st h ec o n t r a c t[PNC,L NC], which is the credit
derivative contract that sustains the separating equilibrium when capital is costless.
Nevertheless, now the high-type banks face a positive cost of capital equal to ρRNC > 0,
as we argued above. The second type of contract is the contract [PO,L O], which is
a separating contract where high-type banks also face no capital cost since, as can be
18easily checked, RO = LO +( I1 + I2) − PO =0 . The high-type banks’ expected proﬁts










The contract [PO,L O] provides less proﬁt than the contracts [PC,L C] and [PNC,L NC]
to the high-type banks, indeed Eπh(PC,L C) >E π h(PNC,L NC) >E π h(PO,L O). In fact,
the contract [PO,L O] is constrained by the non-negativity of the bank proﬁts in all the
states (and especially in the worst state of the world) and therefore capital requirements
are equal to zero. A high-type bank cannot use the signalling content implicit in the
retention of some costly risk, i.e. a risk that generates a positive cost of capital. Since
the signal is less powerful, separation can only be obtained by reducing the price P at
which the loans are sold, thereby reducing the incentive of the low-type bank in buying
this type of contract. The contract [PNC,L NC] can sustain a separating equilibrium only
if high-type banks prefer to face the cost of capital, rather than hedging their capital
loss as would a low-type bank.
Let X denote the amount of coverage in case of default gained by a bank that buys a
hedging contract at price (1−p2
l)X to avoid the cost of capital. We have that X satisﬁes
the following equation:
X − (1 − p
2
l)X − R







19The additional expected cost for a high-type bank, which buys a hedging contract of
amount X as a low-type bank is given by:
X(1 − p
2







and therefore the contract [PNC,L NC] is a separating contract only if the expected cost
of hedging the loss as a low-type bank is lower than or equal to the expected cost of the















When the bank capital is costly and the credit derivative market is opaque we have two





l then the unique CK-separating equilibrium is such that high-type
banks oﬀer the contract [PNC,L NC], and low-type banks oﬀer a plain vanilla contract
at their fair price. Risk-buyers’ beliefs are such that a risk-seller is high-type if it oﬀers





l , then the unique
CK-separating equilibrium is such that high-type banks oﬀer the contract [PO,L O] and
low-type banks oﬀer a plain vanilla contract at their fair price. Risk-buyers’ beliefs are
such that a risk-seller is high-type if it oﬀers the contract [PO,L O],i ti sal o w - t y p e
otherwise.
The level of proﬁts that a high-type bank can obtain by signing the [PO,L O] contract is
not only lower than the ﬁrst best level of proﬁts, but it can be even lower than the level
of proﬁts the high-type obtains in the pooling equilibrium.















(ph−pl)(1+µ) and the credit derivative market
is opaque, then the high-type banks’ proﬁts are larger in the pooling equilibrium than in
the optimal separating equilibrium.
Proof. See the appendix.
4.3 A simple extension to the continuous case
Up to now, we considered a simple discrete case where the only publicly observable
signal is the default of the loans in the portfolio. We consider in this section a slightly
more general model where the initial investment of the bank on the loan portfolio is I
and the public observable signal is the realized cash ﬂows of the loan portfolio, which is
assumed to be a continuous random variable s ∈ [0,M], where M is the maximum cash
ﬂow generated when all loans are repaid. Hence, we model the security as a continuous
and diﬀerentiable function g(s):[ 0 ,M] → R+ which speciﬁes the non-negative amount
that the risk-seller pays to the risk-buyer for any realization of the cash ﬂow s of the
loan portfolio. Let ¯ s ∈ argmaxg(s), that is g(¯ s) is the maximum amount that the risk-
seller agrees to pay to the risk-buyer13, which is relevant to the determination of capital
requirements. Let ρ indicate, as usual, the cost of capital due to the presence of capital
requirements and Fi(s) (fi(s)) denote the conditional distribution (density) function of
s given type i = h,l.L e t Ei(s) be the expected cash-ﬂow of the loan portfolio if the
issuer is of type i. Ac o n t r a c ti sap a i r[P,g(s)], where P is the price paid to the issuer
of the security. Consider directly the case where the credit derivative market is opaque.
A high-type bank that wants to oﬀer a separating contract has to solve the following
problem:




P − I −
Z M
0















¯ s ∈ argmaxg(s) (24)
Note that the cost of capital does not enter into the incentive compatibility constraint,
since the low-type bank can secretly hedge any portion of the security. The solution to
the problem depends upon the speciﬁcation of the conditional density functions fi(s)
for i = h,l. W ep r o v i d eh e r eas u ﬃcient condition that allows a similar result to the
discrete case to be obtained. Namely, we assume that there exists s0 ∈ [0,M] such that
0 <f h(s) ≤ fl(s) for all s ≤ s0 and fh(s) >f l(s) > 0 for all s>s 0.
Proposition 4 If there exists a separating equilibrium, then the optimal separating con-
tract for the high-type banks is a pair (P,g(s)) where (i) g(s)=
Eh(s)−El(s)
Fl(s0)−Fh(s0) = k for all
s ≤ s0 and g(s)=0for all s>s 0; (ii) P =
Eh(s)Fl(s0)−El(s)Fh(s0)
Fl(s0)−Fh(s0) .
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition (4) states that the optimal contract under the continuous distribution of
loan payoﬀs is still a Binary CDB where, if realization of loan repayments is below s0,
the issuer has to pay a ﬁxed amount k. This is in line with the optimal contract in the
discrete payoﬀ case.
225R e g u l a t o r y i m p l i c a t i o n s
The optimal contracts we have described above ﬁt well with many of the contracts we
observe in the market. The contract [PPS,max(K − S,0)] is similar to a CDO where
the risk-seller retains the equity tranche in order to signal its type. The [P,L] is similar
to a contract where the bank sells the loan portfolio and commits to pay a ﬁxed dollar
amount if losses are above a certain level, i.e. it writes a Binary CDB.
In this section we investigate whether the diﬀerent institutional settings may inﬂuence
the structure of optimal signalling contracts and therefore the demand of diﬀerent credit
derivatives for capital requirements reduction.14
In the last two decades we have observed an attempt to change bank capital reg-
ulation. In the early 1980s, as concerns for the ﬁnancial health of international banks
mounted and complaints of unfair competition increased, the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision initiated a discussion on the revision of capital standards. An agreement
was reached in July 1988. The 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I, BCBS (1998)) explicitly con-
sidered only credit risk and imposed an 8% capital requirement on risk-adjusted assets.15
The guidelines do not recognize credit derivatives explicitly. However, the emergence of
credit derivative markets has been treated with cautious support by regulators and, to
date, in order to cover this gap in the regulation, there have been a number of oﬃcial
pronouncements on the regulation of credit derivatives.16
The basic approach taken by regulators is to draw analogies with more conventional
instruments for which a well developed regulatory framework already exists.
14Note that credit derivatives’ demand is related not only to capital requirements but also to liquidity
problems. For an overview and an empirical analysis of why banks use credit derivatives see Minton et
al. (2005).
15Risk-adjusted assets are deﬁned as a weighted sum of bank assets whose weights depend on asset
risk buckets. See Cooke (1990) for the debate that leads to the Accord, BCBS (2005) for the Accord and
its amendments, and Pelizzon and Schaefer (2005) for a detailed description of the main advantages
and drawbacks of the new Accord.
16For an overview of regulatory announcements, see Staehle and Cumming (1999).
23One aspect that needs to be considered is that under Basel I, in most jurisdictions,
CDOs are considered as a portfolio of loan sales and banks face almost no capital re-
quirements for holding the equity tranche.
This setting is similar to the case where the required capital for holding the equity
tranche has a cost equal to zero. Indeed, in this case, holding the equity tranche is a
ﬁrst-best contract. This implies that under Basel I, high-quality banks can optimally
use the equity tranche holding to signal their own type.
However, following its introduction, the Accord has been ﬁne-tuned to accommodate
ﬁnancial innovation and to reﬂect some risks not initially considered. In particular, (see
BCBS (2005)) a new approach, Basel II, has recently been proposed to take into account
some of the limitations of the earlier framework.
More speciﬁcally, the introduction of Basel II capital adequacy rules requires for
CDOs that all ﬁrst-loss positions must be deducted from bank capital.17 This require-
ment is similar to our framework with costly capital. Our results indicate that the
introduction of such a capital requirement may prevent the use of the equity tranche
holding and other contracts characterized by loss smoothing will be optimal signalling
device. An example of such contracts would be the Binary CDB where the ﬁxed dollar
amount paid is largely dependent on the cost of capital. However, the optimality of such
a contract under Basel II capital adequacy rules could be compromised by the opacity
in the OTC credit derivative markets that may prevent the use of credit derivatives as
a signalling device if the cost of capital is large. In fact, the presence of opacity implies
that it is easier for low-type banks to mimic high-type ones. Therefore the separating
contract would still be a Binary CDB but it will be more costly for the high-type banks.
17See BCBS (2005), page 48.
24Hence, when the cost of capital is suﬃciently large, high-type banks may prefer not to
signal their type.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate how the implementation of diﬀerent capital requirement
settings aﬀects the design of the contracts that risk-sellers may oﬀer to signal their own
type.
Using a simple model we show that the existence of a credit derivative market to-
gether with capital requirements for credit risk induces an adverse selection problem
because low-type banks may cover their exposure with credit derivatives. Hence, the
introduction of a credit derivative market does not necessarily always beneﬁtt h ee c o n -
omy. We determine the optimal separating contract and show that such a contract is
diﬀerent according to whether the bank capital is costless, or is costly and whether the
credit derivative market is opaque. In particular, we show that when bank capital is
costly, and capital requirements are based on maximum losses given a certain conﬁdence
level, the optimal contract would be similar to selling the loan portfolio and writing a
binary credit default basket, i.e. a credit default basket where the payoﬀ is a ﬁxed dollar
amount that could be considered a penalty payment in case defaults are beyond some
level.
However, this result holds only if the risk-seller can commit to retaining some risk.
W h e nt h ec o s to fc a p i t a li sl a r g ea n dt h ec r e d i td e r i v a t i v em a r k e ti so p a q u e ,t h eu s e
of signalling contracts could be quite costly. In fact, banks cannot, credibly commit to
retain any risk to signal their own type, and therefore the induced cost of capital has
no signalling content. Therefore, high-type banks may face a cost of capital in writing
25a Binary CDB large enough to destroy the incentive for high-type banks to signal their
own type, since they have larger proﬁts in the pooling equilibrium, than in the separating
one.
To our knowledge this is the ﬁr s tp a p e ri nt h ea c a d e m i cl i t e r a t u r et h a tc o n s i d e r s
rigorously the implications for the design of credit derivatives contracts of two charac-
teristics: capital requirements and opacity of the credit derivative markets.
Our model has a number of implications for regulators. Under Basel I, high-quality
banks can issue CDO contracts and hold the equity tranches to signal their own type.
This is because there is almost no capital requirements for holding the equity tranche.
However, the introduction of Basel II may prevent the use of the equity tranche holding
as signalling device. The optimal separating contract in this case would be a binary
credit default basket. Moreover, the presence of private credit derivative contracts would
make the use of signalling contracts able to solve the adverse selection problem quite
expensive.
We believe that these results are relevant since they show that theoretical predictions
may change depending whether credit derivative market is opaque or not. Since the
assumption that credit derivative markets are opaque seems much more plausible, our
results suggest that the analysis of this market may deserve further investigation.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We show that there exists a separating contract [P,F(S)]
that provides ﬁrst-best level of proﬁts to high-type banks. We consider ﬁrst the case
where F(S)=η(max(K −S,0)). In such a contract a bank sells its loans I1 and I2 to the
risk buyer at price P, and it commits to cover a fraction η o ft h er i s k - b u y e r ’ sl o s s e si n
case of default of any loan. A separating equilibrium has to satisfy both the participation
constraint for the risk-buyer, such that its expected proﬁts are non negative, and the
self-selection constraint for the low-type, such that its expected proﬁts are not larger
when it oﬀers the [P,η(max(K − S,0))] contract than when it oﬀers a CDS basket at
its fair price.




P − (1 − ph)phη(I1 + I2)(1+µ) − (1 − ph)
2η(I1 + I2)(1 + µ) (25)
s.t.
P − η(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)((1 − pl)pl +( 1− pl)
2) ≤ pl(I1 + I2)(1 + µ) (26)
η(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)(1 − ph)+ph(I1 + I2)(1 + µ) − P ≥ 0 (27)
Given the linearity of the problem, the solution can be easily obtained by solving the
two constraints as equality and we obtain η =1and PPS =( I1 + I2)(µ +1 )and the
28high-type bank’s expected proﬁts are equal to Eπh = ph(I1 + I2)(µ +1 ), which are,
of course, the ﬁrst-best level of proﬁts for high-type banks. The separating equilibrium
that satisﬁes the CK-criterion is the strategy proﬁle in which high-type banks oﬀer the
above described [PPS,max(K − S,0)] contract and low-type banks oﬀer full-coverage
plain vanilla contracts at the fair price (1−pl)(I1 +I2). Risk-buyer beliefs are such that
a bank is high-type with probability 1 if it oﬀers the [(I1 + I2)(1+µ),max(K − S,0)]
contract; it is a low-type with probability one otherwise. It is easy to check that these
beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion. To check uniqueness (in welfare terms), note that in
any separating equilibrium where the price oﬀered is P0 <P PS,t h e r ee x i s t sP0 ≤ P00 < ¯ P
such that if a high-type bank deviates by oﬀering a contract [P00,max(K − S,0)],t h e n
by the intuitive criterion a risk-buyer should assign probability one that the proposer is
a high-type bank, since this contract provides positive proﬁts only to high-type banks.
The same argument holds for any separating [P,η(max(K−S,0)] contract with diﬀerent
η.
Nevertheless, note that there are other contracts that are separating and present the
same expected proﬁts for the high-type bank. For example the contract [P,L] where L
is a ﬂat refund payment in case of any default (i.e. F(S)=L|S<(I1 + I2)(1+µ))a n d
P is the price oﬀered for the two loans (a Binary CDB contract).
The maximum price that the counterpart agrees to pay is equal to the expected
proﬁts of the loans minus the expected payment it receives in case of default of any of








P − (1 − p
2
l)L ≤ pl(I1 + I2)(1+µ) (29)
ph(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)+( 1− p
2
h)L − P ≥ 0 (30)














and it provides the same expected payoﬀ to the high-type bank as the contract [PPS,
max(K − S,0)] i.e. Eπh = ph(I1 + I2)(µ +1 ). Therefore, it is an optimal separating
contract.
More speciﬁcally, it follows that there exists a separating [PNC,L NC] contract such
that high-type banks sell loans I1 and I2 in exchange for an amount of money equal to
PNC and commit to pay LNC in case of the default of any loan. Low-type banks sign
full coverage plain vanilla contracts paying the fair premium (1 − pl)(I1 + I2)(1+µ).
The equilibrium beliefs are such that the risk buyer believes that the bank is high-type
if and only if it oﬀers to sign a [PNC,L NC] contract. It is easy to check that these beliefs
satisfy the intuitive criterion.
¥
Proof of Proposition 2:W eﬁrst prove that the optimal separating contract pro-
vides for a ﬂat repayment in case any default occurs. We denote by L1 the amount of
repayment in case only one default occurs and by L2 t h ea m o u n to ft h er e p a y m e n ti n





2L2−2ph(1−ph)L1−ρ(max0,L 2 +( I1 + I2) − P)−(I1+I2) (33)
s.t.
P − (1 − pl)
2L2 − 2pl(1 − pl)L1 − ρ(max0,L 2 +( I1 + I2) − P) (34)
≤ pl(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)
30(1 − ph)
2L2 +2 ph(1 − ph)L1 − P + ph(I1 + I2)(1 + µ) ≥ 0 (35)
L2 − L1 ≥ 0 (36)
L1 ≥ 0. (37)
First order conditions are:
1+ρ − λ(1 + ρ) − µ =0 (38)
δ − (1 − ph)
2 − ρ + λ(1 − p
2
l)+λρ + µ(1 − ph)
2 =0 (39)
γ − 2ph(1 − ph)+λ2pl(1 − pl)+µ2ph(1 − ph) − δ =0 . (40)
Suppose ﬁrst that δ =0(and therefore L2 >L 1). From (38) :
µ =( 1+ρ)(1 − λ) (41)
and therefore it must be that λ<1. Substituting in (39) we obtain:
λ =
1
(1 + ρ)(1− (1 − ph)
2) − p2
l
ρ(1 − (1 − ph)
2) (42)
and substituting in (41) we can easily check that λ<1. Substituting (42) and (41) in
(40) we have that:
γ =2 ρph(1 − ph)(λ − 1) − 2λ(ph − pl)(ph + pl − 1). (43)
Since we proved that λ<1, the ﬁrst term is negative. If ph + pl > 1 the second term is






,t h a tµ<1 and therefore these are suﬃcient conditions for
ph+pl > 1. I nt h es a m ew a yw er e a c hac o n t r a d i c t i o nw h e nL1 >L 2 is assumed. Hence,
to ﬁnd the optimal separating contract we simply solve the following system of equations:
P − (1 − p
2
l)L − ρ(max0,L+( I1 + I2) − P) − pl(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)=0
(1 − p
2
h)L − P + ph(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)=0 . (44)
31It follows that the optimal separating contract [PC,L C] is such that:
L
C =
(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)(ph(1 + ρ) − pl) − ρ(I1 + I2)
(p2





C =( 1− p
2
h)
(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)((ph(1 + ρ) − pl) − ρ(I1 + I2)
(p2
h(1 + ρ) − p2
l)
+ ph(I1 + I2)(1 + µ). (46)
Note that the optimal separating contract [PC,L C] implies that the risk-seller has neg-
ative payoﬀ in the worst state of the world (that is when both loans default), in fact:
P
C − L
C − (I1 + I2)=( I1 + I2)((1+µ)phpl − (ph + pl)) < 0 (47)
if and only if µ<
ph+pl−phpl
phpl , which holds by the assumption that µ<1. Therefore there
is no contract which satisﬁes the above constraint as equality such that there is no cost
of capital.
It is easy to check that indeed the high-type bank has a capital requirement diﬀerent
than zero since PC − LC − (I1 + I2) < 0.M o r e o v e rLC = L if ρ =0and ∂LC
∂ρ < 0. Let
RC ≡ LC +( I1 + I2) − PC denote the capital requirement. We have that:
R
C =
(ph − pl)((ph + pl)(I1 + I2) − phpl(I1 + I2)(1 + µ))
(p2














C)=( I1 + I2)(ph(1 + µ) − 1) − ρˆ L
C. (49)
The expected proﬁt is equal to the ﬁrst-best proﬁt less the signalling cost ρRC that
derives from the fact that the high-type bank signals its type by paying a penalty if
one of the loans defaults (and in this way it covers part of the losses of the risk buyer
in case of default). Note that the capital loss is decreasing in the cost of capital ρ
since it enters negatively in the low-type bank constraint and therefore it reduces the
32incentive of the low-type bank to sign this type of contract. The separating equilibrium
that satisﬁes the CK-criterion is the strategy proﬁle in which high-type banks oﬀer the
contract [PC,L C] and low-type banks oﬀer full-coverage plain vanilla contracts at the
fair price (1 − pl)(I1 + I2). Risk-buyer beliefs are such that a bank is high-type with
probability 1 if it oﬀers the contract [PC,L C]; it is a low-type with probability one
otherwise. The same argument presented in the proof of proposition 1 proves that this
contract is the unique one satisfying the CK-criterion.
¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
In any separating equilibrium the expected proﬁt of the low-type bank is:
Eπl =( I1 + I2)(pl(1 + µ) − 1). (50)
If the low-type bank deviates, signs the contract [PC,L C], and hedges the repayment










An easy calculation shows that Eπl(PC,L C) >E π l if and only if:
µ<
ph + pl − plph
plph
, (52)
that is true by the assumption that µ<1.
¥
Proof of Proposition 3: If the credit derivative market is opaque the risk seller can
secretly hedge its risk exposure with the Binary CDB contract, without the risk-buyer
being informed.
In this case, the optimal separating contract [PNC,L NC] solves the following problem:
max
{P,L}
P − (1 − p
2
h)L + ρ(min{0,P− L − (I1 + I2)}) − (I1 + I2) (53)
33s.t.
P − (1 − p
2
l)L ≤ pl(I1 + I2)(1+µ) (54)
ph(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)+( 1− p
2
h)L − P ≥ 0. (55)
Note that the cost of capital does not enter in the low-type bank’s self selection con-
straints since a low-type can always fully hedge the payment of the ﬁxed amount L at
its fair price (1−p2
l)L. Hence a natural candidate to be the optimal separating contract
is the contract [PNC,L NC], the optimal separating contract when capital is costless.




low-type banks sign CDS basket contracts. The only system of beliefs consistent with
this strategy proﬁle is such that the risk-buyer assigns probability one that the bank
is high-type if it oﬀers the contract [PNC,L NC], and probability one that the bank is
low-type if it oﬀers a diﬀerent contract, namely a plain vanilla contract. The high-type






=( I1 + I2)(ph(1 + µ) − 1) − ρR
NC. (56)






is the cost of capital as before. The sep-
arating equilibrium exists only if high-type banks do not deviate and buy CDS basket
contracts as low-types. The optimal deviation for the high-type bank is buying a hedging
contract of amount X at a unit price of (1 − p2
l), such that:
X − (1 − p
2
l)X − R







34Let Eπh(PNC,L NC,X) denote the expected proﬁts of the high-type bank when it signs






















l then the contract [PNC,L NC] does not sustain a separating equilibrium
in which a low-type bank only buys the CDS basket contract at its fair price. The
separating equilibrium exists only if there is no capital requirement for the bank loan




P − (1 − p
2
h)L − (I1 + I2) (61)
s.t.
P − (1 − p
2
l)L − pl(I1 + I2)(1 + µ) ≤ 0 (62)
ph(I1 + I2)(1 + µ)+( 1− p
2
h)L − P ≥ 0. (63)
The solution of this maximization problem is the following:
P
O =











A further constraint is added with respect to the case with no capital requirements. The
eﬀect of capital requirements and opacity turn out to be similar to a liquidity constraint
such that in no state of the world does the bank face negative cash-ﬂows. The high-type




l (I1 + I2)(pl(1 + µ) − 1). ¥
35Proof of Lemma 2: By simply comparing the two levels of proﬁts we have that the
level of proﬁts of the pooling equilibrium is higher if:
(I1 + I2) − (q(1 − ph)+( 1− q)(1− pl))(I1 + I2)(1 + µ) ≥ p
2
h

















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : First, suppose that there exists an optimal separating
contract ( ˜ P,˜ g(s)) such that the function ˜ g(s) is positive in a neighborhood of s0 >s 0, i.e.





0 ˜ g(s)fl(s)ds and g(s)=0for s>s 0 and a price:











where RS =m i n{0,P− I − g(¯ s)}.
If the contract [ ˜ P,˜ g(s)] is separating, then the contract [P,g(s)] is separating too.
Moreover ˜ g(˜ s) ≥ g(¯ s) and the contract [P,g(s)] provides to the high-type banks a larger
or equal level of proﬁts.
Second, suppose that there exists an optimal contract [ ˜ P,˜ g(s)] where ˜ g(s)=0for
all s ≥ s0 and there exist a pair s0,s 00 <s 0 with ˜ g(s0) > ˜ g(s00). Let ˜ s ∈ argmax ˜ g(s).
Let Ei(s) denote the conditional expected value of the asset owned by type i = h,l.
Since the contract [ ˜ P,˜ g(s)] is separating, then high-type proﬁt sa r ea tm o s tEh(s) −
I + ρ(min{0,P− I − g(¯ s)}). Consider now a continuous function g(s)=k (where k is
a constant and does not depend on s) for all s ≤ s0 (and g(s)=0otherwise) and a
contract [P,k] such that:
P = kFh(s0)+Eh(s) (69)
P = kFl(s0)+El(s). (70)
36By construction, the contract [P,k] is separating and it follows that ˜ g(˜ s) >k : therefore
high-type banks’ proﬁts are larger or equal, by signing a contract [P,k], than by signing
a contract [ ˜ P,˜ g(s)]. Solving the above equations we obtain:
k =
Eh(s) − El(s)
Fl(s0) − Fh(s0)
and:
P =
Eh(s)Fl(s0) − El(s)Fh(s0)
Fl(s0) − Fh(s0)
. (71)
¥
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